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Thinking of Autonomy as Automatism: 
the Case of Autonomy in Thucydides’ History
Pensar la autonomía como automatismo: el caso 
de la autonomía en la Historia de Tucídides
Maria Gerolemou1




The following article engages in an attempt to review and further explore 
the notion of autonomy in Thucydides, which is described by scholars as 
different from freedom, eleutheria, and as primarily assigned to the interests 
of a weaker state that is trying to exert its independence. Without rejecting 
the relational aspect of the notion of autonomy, the article argues further 
on autonomy’s internal aspect, ultimately trying to prove how autonomy in 
Thucydides is moreover presented as an automatic habit and a behavioral 
pattern that reflects a restrictive, political and artificial perspective of external 
superior powers. 
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Resumen
Este artículo pretende revisar y explorar la noción de autonomía en 
Tucídides, considerada por los estudiosos diferente al concepto de libertad, 
eleutheria, y atribuida esencialmente a los intereses de un estado débil 
que intenta ejercer su independencia. Sin rechazar el aspecto relacional de 
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la noción de autonomía, el artículo argumenta sobre su aspecto interno, 
intentando en último término demostrar que la autonomía en Tucídides es 
también presentada como un hábito automático y un patrón de conducta que 
refleja una perspectiva restrictiva, política y artificial de poderes externos 
superiores.
Palabras-clave: autonomía, libertad, automatismos, autómata, necesidad.
Introduction
In the following article, I will attempt to review and also tο elaborate on 
the notion of autonomy in Thucydides. Firstly, I will briefly refer to certain 
important opinions on the matter: According to Bickerman (1958) and Ostwald 
(1982), autonomia in Thucydides differs from eleutheria, freedom, in being 
a concept that emerges from interstate relations, mostly describing a weaker 
state, which is trying to exert its independence. Similarly, Raaflaub (1985) 
argues that autonomy forms an essential component of Spartan politics and 
Athenian foreign policy2. Moreover, he argues that: “[A]utonomia betont die 
Selbstbestimmung, eleutheria das Fehlen der Fremdbestimmung […]” (200). 
Figueira (1990), on the other hand, argues that autonomy in Thucydides does 
not always refer the kind of freedom which is granted by a stronger power, and 
that there is not a sole definition of autonomia that both Athenians and Spartans 
share. Moreover, the Athenian sense of autonomy is described, according to 
Figueira, through its indicators, such as the provision of ships (to Athens), 
the possession of walls and freedom from tributes, whereas, the Spartan idea 
of independence is formed on the basis of a city’s individual and inalienable 
decision to live under its own laws, beyond any manipulative or distorting 
external forces and demands, however, in reconciliation with the hegemonic 
power of Sparta. Based on these grounds and without rejecting the relational 
aspect of the notion of autonomy, I will argue further on its internal aspect 
and engage in an attempt to prove that autonomy in Thucydides is, actually, 
represented as an automatic, un-coerced habit against its restrictive political 
perspective that relates to external superior powers3. Thus, though autonomy 
in Thucydides does not describe a situation that emerges in the absence of 
external interferences, at the same time, it appears to be the automatic outcome 
of an implicit learning process.
2  Cf. further on autonomia Bosworth 1992; Whitehead 1993; on freedom see Diller 1968; Nichols 
2015.
3  This could raise further discussion on the relation between autonomy and the sophistic position 
physis-nomos; cf. on that Antiph. fr. 44 D-K and Gagarin 2002, 2007.
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Automatic Autonomy
Without making any reference to Stoic ideas on autonomy as self-imposed 
and innate –that would be beyond the scope of this paper4– autonomy in 
Thucydides is defined as an intrinsic property of persons, which can be also 
tied to norms; in this sense, it differs from free will, which constitutes the basis 
of freedom. Autonomy is characterized as a human inclination that grounds 
basic rights, i.e. without serving the pursuance of a specific goal that people 
can decide whether or not to attain; sometimes it is even defined as the outcome 
of the interaction between an individual’s biology, environment and cognition 
(as in the below case of Themistocles that this paper explores). By being an 
innate behavior pattern, autonomy exhibits a certain regularity, and it is in line 
with automatisms that describe natural unconscious activities, i.e. self-caused 
action, such as breathing, walking etc., as well as social habits, such as reading, 
dressing, obeying the laws etc5.
In this respect, the classical era approaches autonomy in terms of relatively 
recent debates, such as the one on automaticity. But let us explore first, though 
briefly, the ancient notion of automation: The concept of automation forms, 
according to Hippocratic authors, a constituent part of the forces that operate in 
the body. In her book The Symptom and the Subject (2010), Holmes argues that 
the study of human nature and the effects of the visualization of the inner body in 
Hippocratic writings have revealed its hidden forces; specifically, Hippocratic 
writers have concluded that the body operates in a spontaneous, regular manner, 
automata (cf. e.g. Epid. 5.1.19, Art. 46.29), ek tyches, randomly, or, when the 
physician forcibly intervenes, according to his guidance and knowledge6. Thus, 
medical writers seem to relate both tyche and automaton to a purpose that is, 
however, reached or missed in an unpredicted and unplanned manner, while, at 
the same time, they do not consider these as contradictory to motivated actions 
and techne7. Although the forces in the body are hidden, a trained physician 
may reconstruct them, based on empirical evidence and methods of inference, 
and thus manipulate them to favour a certain treatment. In other words, medical 
treatises suggest the possibility of conscious shaping of bodily automatisms 
through prescribed by the doctors therapies, such as diets, that facilitate or 
replace natural process (cf. e.g. Aphorisms). 
Aristophanes in his Clouds brings a comic analogon to the possible 
control of natural automatisms through human techne. He portrays Strepsiades 
offering both his body and his self to Socrates, the grand teacher, didaskalos, 
4  See e.g. Cooper 2003; Id. 2004. 
5  See on “automatisms” Bublitz, Marek, Steinmann, Winkler 2010.
6  See further Schiefsky 2005: 5-13. On the difference between tyche (confined to mature human 
world) and automaton (confined to nature) see Guthrie 1981, vol. 6 on Aristotle, p. 238-239.
7  Holmes 2010: 142-147; Holmes 2013.
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in the phrontisterion, and allowing him to manipulate it as it pleases him, 
in the hope of learning how to deceive his enemies (439-441). On the other 
hand, in the Homeric epics, for instance, automation accompanies inanimate 
corpora constructed by the gods, which provoke wonderment. An exemplary 
case constitutes the famous scene in the Iliad 18. 372-7 where Thetis visits 
Hephaestus in his workshop to request a shield for Achilles; the scene captures 
Hephaestus sweating as he labors for creating twenty triple-legged tables with 
the ability to imitate movement, in order to automatically roll to the assembly 
of the gods and back home8; what is described here with the term ‘automaton’ 
is actually the artificial reproduction, or else the outcome of the divine craft 
of Hephaestus and of the physical movement which is inserted to the tripods9. 
Likewise, in Herodotus, natural automation as well as its artificial 
replication remains subordinate to a divine nous or to the purposively 
teleological plan of nature. Herodotus, for instance in 2.94.1, describes how 
in Greece castor-berries, σιλλικύπρια, grow wild, αὐτόματα, while in Egypt 
they are products of cultivation (cf. e.g. 8.138.2, 4.74). Yet, even non natural 
automation is explained by Herodotus as the outcome of divine will. As such, 
are the sacred arms, which are found outside the temple of Athena Pronea 
and which initiate in an automatic way their own motion (8.37), forming in 
this way a category of non-scientifically explained, i.e. divine phenomena10. 
Herodotus appears generally reluctant to define automation as the outcome of 
human agency and craft. In 2.48, for instance, he points to the fact that during 
Dionysus’ feast in Egypt, astonishingly great mechanical phalluses, part of the 
statues of Dionysus, moved automatically. But on the fact that those genitals are 
so large and on their ability to move there is a sacred explanation, as Herodotus 
tell us, which of course he never mentions. 
The question to be asked next is how the conception of autonomy is defined 
within the field of automaticity that has just been described. As argued above, 
autonomy, suggesting an uninformed decision, reveals automatic techniques 
of self-governing. For example, references on Thracian autonomy in terms 
of living in a non-organized state exist already in Herodotus (Hdt. 5.3.1). 
Similarly, in Thucydides, the Thracians are often called autonomous on the 
basis of living in an open-choice system; for instance, in 2.98.3 many Thracians 
follow Sitalces, the king of the Thracian Odrysians, and his army without being 
forced, aparakletoi (see further 2.96.2-4; 2.29.2)11. Moreover, in the Hippocratic 
Corpus the term autonomy is solely used four times, specifically in the De aere 
aquis et locis, where the ethnic character of Europe and Asia is explained on 
8  Cf. further on automatism in Homer e.g. Il. 5.749, 8. 393, Od. 8. 555-563.
9  Generally on automata in antiquity, see among others Pugliara 2003 (with a bibliographical 
overview on the subject in pp. xxvi-xxxi); Francis 2009: esp. at 8-10.
10  Cf. Shimron 1989; Thomas 2000: ch. 5.
11  On the special interest of Thucydides in the Thracians see Zahrnt 2006: 610-4.
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the basis of an environmental determinism12. In 16.17-39, the author tries to 
elucidate how the unwarlike character of the Asians is influenced by the nature 
of the seasons, who remain unchangeable to heat or cold; at the same time, 
however, argues the author further, the Asians seem to avoid the risks of war 
because of their despotic political system, i.e. because of their non-independent 
status that does not allow them to benefit from war13. Due to these, even when a 
brave man is born among them, he changes his temper according to the status of 
their non-autonomy obviously reflecting back to temperamental indifference. 
In contrast, as the author of the treatise argues, “[a]ll the inhabitants of Asia, 
whether Greek or non-Greek, who are not ruled by despots, but are independent, 
toiling for their own advantage, are the most warlike of all men”14 (see e.g. Hdt. 
1.95.2, 1.96.1). It is apparent here that both, i.e. autonomy and climatic data, 
constructed in analogy, are perceived as responsible for creating an essential 
model on the formation and the development of an ethnic identity. 
Likewise, in one of the oldest works where the concept of autonomy 
is employed15, namely Sophocles’ Antigone, autonomy emerges as a natural 
condition against the dominance of social institutions. More explicitly, 
Sophocles uses the term ‘autonomy’ to describe Antigone’s attitude or character 
in defying her uncle’s rules and the laws of Thebes for the sake of the unwritten 
laws of the gods16. The autonomous way of Antigone is identified with her 
spontaneous action to set the laws of the gods above the laws of the state and, 
as a woman, to cherish her deceased relatives17; it is actually the way marked 
by the structuralist reading of the play as the natural way, which derives from 
Antigone’s youth and female nature, that is analogous through opposition to 
the non-natural way of Creon, due to his male, civic identity18. Who could be a 
better follower of such λωβητῆρες ὑστεροφθόροι/[...] Ἅιδου καὶ θεῶν Ερινύες 
(1074f.), the avenging destroyers, the Furies of Hades and the gods, if not a 
politically inexperienced girl, still a virgin and without a citizen status? To 
elaborate, it is precisely because she is non married that she cannot adequately 
12  Cf. Thomas 2000: esp. ch. 3 & 4.
13  Cf. Ostwald 1982: 12; Figueira 1990: 64, n. 5.
14  Tr. Jones (Loeb). 
15  Ostwald 1982: 10f., Raaflaub 1985: 205; Figueira 1990: 110; Cooper 2004. 
16  See Blundell 1989: 128: “[...] Antigone is a law into herself”; similar Goldhill 1986: 103 and 
Jebb 1891 ad loc: “of your own free will”; See further Kamerbeek 1978 and also Griffith 2008 ad loc. 
This is not simply a matter of disobedience to the established laws of Creon (v. 481); αὐτόνομος rather 
means ‘weird’ than ‘disobedient’. A woman who acts and who stands against the authority of the ruler 
is strange enough. See further Else 1976: 63-82. 
17  See on that Tyrrell und Bennett 1998: 19, 27. See further siehe Loraux 1992: passim; cf. Alexiou 
1974: 15-22.
18 Antigone stands closer to nature and away from organized society. For instance, her voice is 
compared to that of a bird (423-5); she is often apostrophized as an animal (477f, cf. also 433, 775) 
and in v. 569 as earth (Γαία). See also the comparison of Antigone with Niobe, the mater dolorosa 
(826f., and Soph. El. 148-152), who in the end becomes a part of nature, a stone πετραία βλάστα, 
ὄμβρῳ, ώιών. Cf. among other structuralist readings of Ch. Segal on Antigone: Segal 1978.
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assess political life and its constituent regulations. However, only she, and not 
her sister Ismene (also not married), can articulate the ‘physical’ or family ties 
against the ‘artificiality’ of political life and laws, because only she, as Ismene 
remarks, strikes the impossible amêchanon (92)19.  She does not, as a woman, 
merely raise her voice against a man, but rather, as the drama shows in its 
length, sees and loves death less than life (361f., 220, θανεῖν ᾷρᾷ)20. The chorus 
calling her action autonomous (821), indeed expresses the concern with regards 
to a tradition that is based on the dubious relationship between self-education 
(autodidakton) and outside instruction (didache), here, from the civic nomoi 
formed by Creon; this becomes more obvious, when the chorus describes her 
further as autognotos, self-willed for insisting on her pious action to bury her 
brother according to the laws of the gods, risking in this way to dishonor the 
laws of men (875; cf. 1028).
Likewise, the case of Themistocles in Thucydides teaches us important 
autonomy lessons; his greatness and strength of judgment is effectuated by his 
natural prudence and his self-imposed genius (autoschedios), which is worthy 
of admiration21. According to Thucydides, “[…] Themistocles was a man who 
had most convincingly demonstrated the strength of his natural sagacity, and 
was in the very highest degree worthy of admiration in that respect. For by 
native in-sight, not reinforced by earlier or later study, he was beyond other men, 
with the briefest deliberation, both a shrewd judge of the immediate present 
and wise in forecast” (1.138.3)22. From this perspective, Themistocles can be, 
for instance, contrasted to Euagoras, as described by Isocrates, who although 
“gifted by nature with the highest intelligence and capable of successful 
action in many fields, yet he judged that he should not slight any matter or 
act on the spur of the moment in public affairs” (9.44; cf. Xen. Mem., 3.5.22, 
Hell. 5.2.32)23. The autonomy of Themistocles, in terms of his “self-taught” 
(automathes) and instinctive praxis, is disassociated from pre-determined 
politics, and this essentially constitutes an analogy to Athenian autonomy, as 
described by Thucydides with the occurrence of migration from the countryside 
into the city in 431. More specifically, the Athenians were living, according to 
Thucydides (2.16.1), autonomously in the countryside despite the synoikism 
that was delineated by the laws of their country and which was forcing them to 
migrate into the city (cf. 6.88.4). The same notion of autonomy designed and 
19  On Antigone’s anti-confirmative action concerning her gender-identity, see Gerolemou 2011: 
ch. 5. 
20  See Benardete 1975: 164, 193f.
21  On Themistocles in Thucydides see Erbse 1968: 607-615; Tsakmakis 1995: 139-144, esp. 143f.
22  Tr. Smith (Loeb). One could argue that Themistocles’ self-determination is reminiscent of the 
Stoic terminology that was attached to wise people, whose all actions were determined by nature, as 
they considered that the proper understanding of how nature works to be of primary importance. Cf. 
Cicero’s Stoic Paradoxes 5, sec. 34 on the autonomy of the wise.
23  Tr. Hook (Loeb).
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represented as against laws of man pervades Pericles in Funeral Oration (2.34-
46), where the idea of the Athenian eleutheria, freedom and democracy shares 
with autonomy the self-determination that should define public life (2.37.2). 
The citizen’s body is autarchic (autarkes) insofar as it is freely to choose if it 
wishes to obey the laws of the country; it is, then, mere deos, fear that prevents 
the citizens of Athens from transgressing the laws and not hetero-determined 
forces that work as a warning of the consequences for breaking the law. 
Moreover, the Athenians do not rely on preparations but upon their own courage 
(2.39.1) and, generally, they are not used to laborious exercises (in their youth); 
this however does not restrict their readiness to confront great dangers. Rather, 
without labour and based on natural rather than doctrinal braveness24, although 
they believe in being instructed before they act (2.40.2–3), they willingly fight 
any threat (2.39.4; cf. 6.33.2). On the other hand, Archidamus defends the 
Spartan way of life, especially in deference to the law that maintained Sparta 
as a free city for such a long period of time (1.84.1–3). Moreover, Xenophon 
in his Constitution of the Lacedaemonians 3.1-4, praises Lycurgus’ laws, in 
contrast to the habits which are noted in other cities, where boys are allowed 
to behave according to their own laws (autonomoi); in Sparta the autonomy of 
teenage boys is constrained with constant tutoring (cf. Isocrates Panathenaicus 
215 6-9).
Constructed Autonomy
Autonomy as an inherent value is unintentional and not governed by 
external powers; still as an automatism , i.e. something unconsciously repeatable, 
it establishes a high degree of order, and it could be conceived as a generative 
force that gives rise to a concept of autonomy that has constructed features 
and boundaries. The term appears during the years of the Delian league25. The 
tyrannical activities of Athens towards its allies force the conscious goal of 
freedom, eleutheria, which is expressed by the allies, to prevail over autonomy 
that is forced to adapt its unconscious character adjust its unconscious character 
to a purposive rationality. It is this kind of autonomy-freedom that is conveyed 
to the allies by the Spartans as an objective, usually in an active tone and in the 
form of maxims like “saving Hellas”, or “freeing Hellas”26; although Sparta 
24  On the other hand, Nicias, in his attempt to inspirit his soldiers (including the many non-
Athenians), after their defeat during the Sicilian expedition (7.60-2), argues that if one has knowledge 
of the Greek language and is able to imitate the Athenian manners, could be considered Athenian and, 
as such, be honored and admired throughout Hellas (cf. 2.37, 4.62-4, 5.97).
25  Raaflaub 1985, 191f., 203; see further on the origins of the concept Bickerman 1958 (located 
in sixth century BC) and Ostwald 1982 (fifth century BC). We cannot trace it beforehand, though see 
Hdt. 8.140 where the term used by Mardonius is a synonym of freedom.
26  Cf. Raaflaub 1985, 204-7; Figueira 1990, 64; Tamiolaki 2010, ch. 2.
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does not seek complete independence for the allies but rather the restoration 
of their original status within the Hellenic league. The Spartans are portrayed 
as the ones who will give back to Greece its freedom (cf. e.g. 2.8.4, 4.85.1; 
cf. further 1.124.3, the Corinthians, 1.139.1 the Aeginetans, 2.71.2, 2.72.1 
the Plataeans) and effectuate the previous autonomous status of the Greeks 
(1.139.3, 4.86.1); as defined by Brasidas in 4.86.1, the Spartan state guarantees 
both a balance of parties and freedom (see also 4.87.5, 4.88.1)27. Brasidas argues 
on the eleutheria from the Athenian tyranny of the citizens of Akanthos, and, 
simultaneously, on their autonomy in the symmachia28. Likewise, in 1.67.2, the 
Aeginetans assert that, their independence was no longer guaranteed to them 
kata tas spondas referring to the Thirty Years Peace; their wish is formed on the 
basis of an argument which sparked the Spartan decision to give an ultimatum 
to the Athenians with respect to the freedom of the allies29. In 5.77.5 and 
5.79.1, the concluded treaty between Argos and Sparta (limited to the cities, 
autopolies) is described as katta patria, i.e. according to a tradition favorable 
to the interests of Sparta and Argos (cf. 5.18.2)30. Moreover, in 1.44.2, Pericles 
argues that the autonomy of the allies should not be adapted (epitedeios) to the 
interests of the Spartans31, while in 1.140.3-4, the Athenians summarize the 
claims of the Spartans: “For they command us to arise from before Potidaea 
and to restore the Aeginetans to the liberty of their own laws and to abrogate 
the act concerning the Megareans. And they that come last command us to 
restore all the Grecians to their liberty”. For this reason, in 1.144.2, according 
to Pericles, the Athenians are willing to allow these states to be independent if 
they held their independence when the peace was concluded (cf. 1.113.4). 
On the other hand, the Athenian idea of autonomy appears to be homologous 
with its natural model explored above, which is formed against legal provisions 
and conveyed via unconscious procedures that can neither be planned nor 
predicted. In this respect, the term autonomy is used by the Athenians as a means 
of claiming from their allies to re-adjust their automatic choice for independence 
to the new condition, which, ironically, coincides with the establishment of the 
Athenian arche32 to rule as ‘a necessity of nature’ (5.105.1–2)33. To elaborate, 
what we have described above as the common automatic and natural aspect 
of autonomy serves the Athenians by facilitating the conceptualization of an 
external and, at the same time, artificial autonomy designed according to the 
Athenian taste; this is legalized through the belief that the Athenian arche is 
27  Cf. Ostwald 1982: 22; Raaflaub 1985: 194.
28  See Bickerman 1958: 326f.
29  Cf. Ostwald 1982: 23 and Hornblower 1991 ad loc; but see Figueira 1990, 74.
30  Figueira 1990: 66; See further Bickerman 1958: 333; Ostwald 1982: 3-9; see further Whitehead 
1993: 328f.; Hansen 1995: 30. 
31  See Figueira (1990) 74.
32  See on the Athenian arche Schuller 1978; Giovannini, Gottlieb 1980. 
33  On anagke in Thucydides see Ostwald 1988, esp. ch. 2 and Munson 2001, esp. for Herodotus.
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foremost based on the natural principles that the weaker should obey the one 
who has more power (1.76.2, 4.61.5, 5.105.2). This becomes a necessity to 
which every ally should prioritize over its own needs (cf. Pericles’ praise of 
Athens as a school, paideia for Hellas, 2.41.1). Thereafter, the Athenians are 
represented as the leaders, ἡγούμενοι of the autonomoi symmachoi, of the 
independent allies (1.97.1). Cleon, for instance in the Mytilenean debate, insists 
that the Mytileneans were autonomoi enough under their rule (3.39.2). On the 
other hand, Diodotus, representing the moderate faction in Athens, argues that 
the eikos, the reasonable, the appropriate always accompanies autonomia; 
this is what one should have expected, namely that free communities which 
were subverted by the Athenian hegemony, will someday desire to assert their 
autonomy (3.45.6). Furthermore, the Mytileneans speaking at the Olympic 
festivals in front of the allies primarily identify eleutheria with autonomia 
according to the Spartan idea of autonomy (3.10.5; 3.11.1). In 3.11.3, however, 
they describe the type of autonomy which they are enjoying under the Athenian 
and state by arguing that only in name they are in fact eleutheroi (3.10.5) and 
their autonomy, here political independence in the symmachia (1.97.1), is 
constructed solely according to the interests of the Athenians and nourished 
through euprepeia logou, propriety of speech, gnome, judgement and ischys, 
power (cf. 3.39.2, 4.86.1)34. That the desire of freedom should not constitute 
the basis of autonomy, but rather the imperative of the Athenian arche becomes 
more obvious in 6.69.3., where there is a differentiation between autonomous 
allies and non free, upekooi allies fighting together with the Athenians in Sicily. 
Moreover, in 6.85.2 Euphemus, at the conference at Kamarina, distinguishes 
between non free, subject allies, autonomous, like Chios and the Methymnians 
of Lesbos and completely independent allies, eleutheroi, like the islands 
in the Ionian Sea (but see 7.57.4, 7.57.7 on the restricted autonomy of the 
Cephallenians, Zacynthians and Chians), which were not members of the 
symmachia and only had an individual alliance- relationship with Athens35. 
On the other hand, the treaty on the precinct and the temple of Apollo, which 
guarantees not only its autonomy but also its autoteleia, i.e. to have control of 
its own revenues and of its own courts of justice, autodikon (5.18.2), approaches 
the meaning of eleutheria as going against Athens, who wished for Delphi to be 
under Phokian control (1.112.5)36.
34  Raaflaub 1985: 200
35  See further Raaflaub 1985: 197f. on the autonomy of Aegina, Samos, Lesbos, Chios where he 
argues on a special status after keeping their former equality relationship to the hegemonic power of 
Athens.
36  See Hornblower 2008 ad loc, who argues further: “But the present clause may not be wholly 
one-sided in intention: recent Spartan efforts to maximize their influence in the Delphic amphiktiony, 
by the foundation in 426 of Herakleia in Trachis […] have worried the Athenians”.
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Epilogue
Based on the principle of human integrity and according to the needs of 
a certain historical period, autonomy in Thucydides is definitely not a result 
of human agency, but it is rather an intrinsic situation. As a habit of thought, 
in Thorstein Veblen’s wording, autonomy in Thucydides is being unmasked 
as reflexive, i.e. automatic, natural. As such, it is formed according to various 
necessities and external powers and constructs a fait social. More precisely, 
autonomy, defined as natural inclination, is forced during the Peloponnesian 
war to take into account people’s acquired needs. On the one hand, the Spartan 
propaganda equates freedom with autonomy, in order for the Spartans to be 
named as liberator of Greece; on the other hand, the Athenians take advantage 
of the common natural character of autonomy, which they propagate further in 
their declarations, with the aim to establish themselves as a natural force.
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